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1.0  Introduction 
 
There are many tangled normative and technical questions involved in evaluating the quality of 
software used in epidemiological simulations. In this paper we answer some of these questions 
and offer practical guidance to practitioners, funders, scientific journals, and consumers of 
epidemiological research.  The heart of our paper is a case study in which we provide an analysis 
of the Imperial College London (ICL) covid-19 simulator.   This simulator is arguably the most 
influential piece of scientific software in the history of public health policy-making.  Our 
analysis, combined with reflection on the state of the art in the philosophy of epidemiology and 
the ethics of engineering serves as the basis for our recommendations for future epidemiological 
modeling projects. We contend that epidemiological simulators should be engineered and 
evaluated within the framework of safety-critical standards developed by consensus of the 
software engineering community for applications such as automotive and aircraft control 
systems.  To achieve that goal, the development and use of epidemiological simulators must have 
high levels of transparency, explainability, and reproducibility.  Furthermore, we recommend 
that such standards be mandated by funding agencies for epidemiological contexts that have 
direct and significant public policy implications. 
We begin by explaining some of the unique features of epidemiological modeling. This 
discussion draws on recent work in the philosophy of epidemiology. We then highlight relevant 
research on the epistemology of computational modeling and simulation. From there, we turn to 
engineering ethics and practice, describing the consensus framework for software engineering 
that has developed over the past four decades in the software engineering community.  The 
purpose of this framework is to provide a principled approach to balancing development cost and 
schedule against the possible harms of using software in high-risk venues.  Within that 
framework, we evaluate the publicly accessible simulator archive of the Imperial College 
London (ICL) covid-19 simulator (ICL 2020c).  Our study of ICL 2020c demonstrates that it 
does not satisfy the standards for safety-critical software in established industry and government 
practice.   
We recognize that ICL 2020c has been subject to intense critical scrutiny because of its 
role in government decision making during the covid-19 pandemic, and our purpose here is not 
to pile additional criticism on the work of the ICL team.  In this paper, we focus solely on the 
publicly available artifacts associated with the simulator (ICL 2020c).   We do not assess the 
empirical assumptions or epidemiological methodology employed by the ICL team. Instead, we 
hope that by carefully considering this high-profile epidemiological simulator, we can encourage 
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scientific and philosophical communities to reflect on the norms governing the engineering of 
scientific software in a wide range of important contexts.  
Determining appropriate software standards for epidemiological simulators is not a 
straightforward matter: it requires an ongoing interdisciplinary effort.  In addition to questions of 
social value and moral responsibility, epidemiological simulators are often informed or 
constrained by a range of epistemic, mathematical, economic, and technological considerations.  
Philosophers of science are beginning to understand the trade-offs among these factors and are 
becoming increasingly sensitive to the implications of software-intensive scientific inquiry 
(Symons and Horner 2014).  Philosophers have also recognized that we cannot understand 
appropriate norms for scientific practice solely by reasoning about them a priori - we must take 
empirical evidence and technical constraints into account.1  The standards governing the 
development of important epidemiological simulators cannot be left solely to epidemiological 
practitioners. The development of these standards requires careful normative reasoning that is 
often beyond the expertise of such practitioners.  In addition to falling outside of their area of 
scientific specialization, the normative questions governing scientific inquiry involve balancing 
the interests of the practitioners themselves with those of others. Standards for the development 
of epidemiological simulators must accordingly accommodate the interests of both the 
consumers of epidemiological research and the interests of the broader public that is affected by 
the public policy decisions influenced by this research.  In the fraught context of epidemiology 
this task involves balancing competing social values.    
 
2.0  Policy making, social values, and epidemiological computer simulations 
 
Computing technologies have played an important role in medical and biological practice in 
economically developed societies since at least the 1960s (See e.g. Keller 2002; November 
2014).  Evaluating the role and usefulness of data-driven computational models and simulations 
is complicated in biological contexts for reasons others have explored in detail (See eg. Leonelli 
2011; 2012; 2016, and Stevens 2017 for example). Epidemiology is an even more challenging 
context for evaluating the role of computational models and simulations than, for example, in 
molecular biology for reasons we will discuss below. More generally, as many philosophers have 
noted, computational models have distinctive technical and epistemological features that make 
them uniquely difficult to assess.2  While philosophers have addressed the role of data science 
and computational modeling in biological contexts for two decades there has been relatively little 
scholarly attention given to the norms governing the engineering practices underlying these 
models.  Likewise, while philosophers of epidemiology have correctly emphasized the normative 
and political aspects of research in epidemiology, they have largely neglected the norms guiding 
engineering practices in the development of epidemiological models and simulations.  Since 
models and simulations are fundamental to epidemiological predictions and recommendations, 
they should also be subject to critical scrutiny.  
 
1 Developers of any large piece of software must face practical and theoretical constraints on error correction.  See, 
for example, Horner and Symons 2019, Symons and Horner 2019. 
2 See for example López-Rubio and Ratti (2019) for a discussion of the trade-offs between mechanistic explanation 
and prediction in applications of machine learning to molecular biology.   
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In the context of epidemiology, computational modeling and simulation techniques have 
become indispensable research tools (See Smolinski et. al 2003).  As Boschetti and colleagues 
have noted, computational modeling is sometimes our only way of advancing scientific inquiry 
in contexts where ethical considerations or practical constraints prevent the use of traditional 
experimental techniques (Boschetti et al 2012).  In epidemiology, highly complicated 
simulations and the manipulation of large data sets, along with the ethical and practical obstacles 
to experimentation have meant that computational methods have become centrally important 
research tools.   
During the COVID-19 pandemic in particular it was widely reported that the results of 
computer simulations provided by the ICL team weighed decisively in public policy 
deliberations in both the UK and US governments (Landler and Castle 2020).  Government 
officials are reported to have relied on epidemiological modeling and simulation to predict 
mortality due to the virus and to anticipate its effects on the healthcare system.  These 
simulations are also used to assess the relative merit of alternative interventions and public health 
responses to the pandemic (Freedman 2020).3  In an emergency decision making context, it is 
reasonable to turn to acknowledged experts on the relevant topics and throughout the pandemic, 
political decision makers in the UK government have been eager to present their decisions as 
grounded in the best available scientific evidence (UK Government 2020).  The extent to which 
decision makers have or have not ‘followed the science’ has become a fraught and highly 
politicized matter in many democratic societies (Stevens 2020; Sharma 2020).   
The role and status of computer simulations frequently figures, albeit unsystematically, in 
debates about what it means for governments and institutions to ‘follow the science’.  It is clear 
from reporting and from the actions of the UK government that the simulation results provided 
by the ICL team were decisively important in policy deliberations in March and April of 2020 
(Landler and Castle 2020).4  It is also clear that the ICL group occupied a high position of 
scientific authority and trust from the perspective of political decision makers.   
In these discussions it is often mistakenly assumed that policy is fully determined by our 
best epidemiology.  As we explain below, this assumption involves a misunderstanding of both 
the nature of epidemiology and its proper role in decision-making in democratic societies.  
Difficult trade-offs between different kinds of societal values and moral obligations will not, 
generally, be resolved by scientific expertise.  Epidemiologists cannot tell us, for example, in the 
case of the COVID-19 epidemic whether public health interventions ought to value the well-
being or education of children more highly than reducing the health risks to the elderly. These 
are moral and political decisions that are not illuminated directly by increased scientific 
understanding or better models and simulations.  
‘Follow the science’ presumably means ‘follow the best science’.  However, determining 
which epidemiological recommendation is best is not a straightforward matter.  Given the 
 
3 Perhaps the most important policy role of these simulations has been their perceived predictive power.  For a 
discussion of the predictive role of computational models see Boschetti and Symons (2011) and Symons and 
Boschetti (2013).  See Ioannidis et al. (2020) for an assessment of the predictive power of prominent covid-19 
modeling efforts to date.   
4 In mid-March, the ICL model was predicting that absent any public health interventions, the UK would suffer half 
a million deaths from COVID-19 (2 million deaths in the U.S.). 
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complexity of the factors relevant to decision making during a pandemic, the public in 
democratic societies and their political representatives have placed great trust in the community 
of epidemiologists.  This is understandable, but often, public declarations of trust have implicitly 
projected an idealized and unrealistic level of neutrality and objectivity onto epidemiological 
research.  This runs counter to our best critical understanding as drawn from philosophy of 
epidemiology.  As we will explain below, disagreement among epidemiologists often stems from 
differences with respect to values (Stevens 2020).5 The way we have assigned trust to the 
epidemiological community is not unreasonable, but it involves oversimplification that can lead 
us to misunderstand our responsibilities as consumers of their research. We are operating with 
something like the following commonsense understanding of the relationship between scientific 
expertise and policy making:  
 
Commonsense view of scientific evidence as a guide to policy making 
Decisions that involve risk of serious harm require us to deliberate as carefully as is 
feasible.  Policy makers often have to rely on expert advice since our best available 
evidence and guidance for decision-making in many matters comes from scientific 
experts. In such contexts, it is usually rational to follow the advice of the relevant 
scientific community in order to increase the likelihood that our decisions promote our 
values and interests.  Commonsense recognizes that natural science cannot tell us what 
we ought to value or what our policy goals ought to be. Nevertheless, under ideal 
circumstances science can provide an understanding of the facts in a way that helps us to 
act consistently with the moral or political principles we share.   
Much in this prescription is in our view correct.  However, it draws a sharp distinction 
between social values and norms and scientific inquiry in a way that is clearly inappropriate in 
the case of epidemiology for reasons we will explain below.  The assumption that epidemiology 
is value neutral makes our insistence on the importance of high standards for scientific software 
seem like an unwarranted intrusion on scientific practice.  However, there are degrees of 
neutrality in the sciences when it comes to values.  For example, when one turns to an 
epidemiologist for advice, one cannot be as confident of the value neutral nature of their 
scientific judgment as one would be in discussions with a chemist.  Philosophy of epidemiology 
has highlighted the complex moral and political landscape of the study of epidemics. In this 
context the standards governing how software for simulations ought to be applied are similarly 
complex.  
Disputes within epidemiology involve normative considerations in ways that disputes 
between chemists or physicists, for example, almost never do.  Consider debates concerning the 
social determinants of health, where disputants may offer causal stories about the origins of some 
 
5 See Stevens (2020) for a discussion of the confusion around ‘follow the science’ rhetoric in UK policy making.  He 
writes: “A provisional and contested set of statements about how the world is cannot be used directly as a rule for 
what governments should do. Ministers have to decide for themselves. They must take responsibility for these 
decisions and their own inevitable mistakes, rather than relying on science as if it were an apolitical and indisputable 
tablet of stone.” https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0894-x 
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public health concern that assume, or are motivated at least in part by their preferred socio-
political values.6  In epidemiology, social, political, and other considerations are difficult to 
disentangle from the manner in which scientific questions are framed.  The way epidemiologists 
think about causation, agency, possible interventions, relevant populations, risk, disease, and 
responsibility, are all informed by the values governing their practice.7     
Public reflection on norms is relevant for the practice and not just the application of 
epidemiology. In order to explain why, consider a disease like type-2 diabetes. There are 
interventions that would be effective in stopping the spread of this disease that we would regard 
as unconscionable violations of individual autonomy, or that most of us would presently regard 
as contrary to the ultimate goals of public health.8  For example, we might reject heavy taxation 
on calorie dense foods, mandatory exercise programs, etc. as possible responses to the disease 
because of the importance of other kinds of social goods. Generally speaking, the set of 
acceptable interventions available to us for public health problems will be shaped by a range of 
social values.   
In addition to disagreeing with respect to what would count as an acceptable intervention 
in public health, social groups may also disagree over what kinds of health issues should be 
classified as diseases or as epidemics.  There is considerable disagreement over, for example, the 
claim that common mental health problems like anxiety and depression should be regarded as 
epidemics.9 Claims that obesity or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder are at epidemic levels 
in the United States, for example, are difficult to state categorically without reference to a large 
set of controversial normative assumptions. Ultimately, social values are negotiable. People with 
differing values can attempt to persuade one another with respect to the relative importance of 
conflicting values.  Given the role of social values in determining the space of acceptable public 
health interventions, the characterization of health, and the taxonomy of disease, epidemiological 
inquiry will always be situated within a particular social context and cannot be entirely neutral 
with respect to normative questions. 
Attempts to characterize the subject matter of epidemiology will also generally require 
reference to concepts that have normative features. Mathilde Frérot and colleagues surveyed the 
literature from 1978 to 2017 in order to determine the ways that epidemiologists understand their 
enterprise and how that understanding has changed through time.  They examine 102 definitions 
of ‘epidemiology’ and found that five terms were present in more than 50% of definitions: 
“population”, “study”, “disease”, “health” and “distribution” (Frérot et al. 2018).  Philosophers 
of epidemiology have noted that definitions of epidemiology will vary depending on the social 
and political contexts involved.  In their introduction to the recent Synthese volume on 
 
6 See Broadbent 2012 for a discussion of causal reasoning in epidemiology  
7 As mentioned above, for example, during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, harm to the education of the 
young and risks to the life of very elderly people were weighed against one another without a great deal of explicit 
public deliberation.  The assumptions about social priorities that motivated school closures and other interventions 
that harmed children and young people may well be defensible.  The kinds of interventions that were attempted in 
the early stages of the pandemic are all defensible given some set of social values.  In most cases, epidemiologists 
did not engage in explicit and public deliberation concerning their presuppositions about social values when they 
offered their initial recommendations with respect to interventions. 
8 See Tabish et.al 2007 for a defense of categorizing diabetes as an epidemic.   
9 See Baxter et al 2014 for an argument against considering common mental health problems like anxiety and 
depression as epidemics.   
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philosophy of epidemiology, Jonathan Kaplan and Sean Valles emphasize this contested nature 
of epidemiology (Kaplan and Valles 2019).10  They contend that “since the welfare of 
populations and communities are always at stake in epidemiology, the issues at hand are directly 
or indirectly political issues” (Kaplan and Velles 2019). 
Our task in this paper is to encourage attention to the norms governing software 
engineering in epidemiology.  The significance of these models for policy decisions that affect 
many of us in significant ways is clear.  Given that epidemiology is not normatively neutral to 
the degree that scientific disciplines like chemistry or physics might be, there are good reasons to 
believe that non-practitioners have a right and an interest to concern themselves with the 
standards governing software engineering in this discipline.  Funders, journals, policy makers, 
and the broader public are entitled to require that standards are sufficiently high to ensure that 
simulations are trustworthy.  In the next section we discuss some of the most important aspects 
of trustworthiness for computer simulations. As we shall argue, part of determining the standards 
for what count as good software engineering practice will be determined by the level of risk  
involved in the deployment of the simulation.   
 
3.0  The epistemology of epidemiological computer simulations 
 
As discussed above, there has been significant public interest in the trustworthiness of 
epidemiological models.  Most criticisms have raised doubts concerning the assumptions and the 
quality of the data that go into the models rather than with respect to the quality of the software 
underlying simulations.  Our focus in the following is on properties of the software as software,  
rather than the scientific status of the assumptions, the mathematical models, or the quality of the 
data driving these simulations. Occasionally, critics have pointed to weaknesses in the publicly 
available code for simulators and we will address some of these criticisms below (Lewis 2020).11  
As we argued in the previous section, the quality of the engineering, in addition to the quality of 
the science is a relevant topic for philosophical reflection.     
In recent years philosophers have addressed some of the central epistemic problems 
associated with computer simulations in science.12  One standard approach to understanding why 
scientific communities come to trust simulations relies on an analogy with the ways that 
epistemic entitlements work in other less controversial forms of inquiry (See for example 
Barberousse and Vorms, 2014). In ordinary life, for example, we are generally entitled to trust 
 
10They contrast what they see as the divergence between the views of the World Health Organization and the United 
States Centers for Disease Control.  While they do not provide evidence for divergence between these two 
organizations, they do note two conflicting characterizations of epidemiology, both of which are drawn from the 
Dicker et. al’s (2006) document for the CDC: “Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of 
health-related states or events in specified populations, and the application of this study to the control of health 
problems.” (2006, I-1) and later in the same document: “in epidemiology, the ‘patient’ is the community” (2006, I–
4).  See Frérot et al. 2018 for a careful empirical assessment of the variety of ways that epidemiology has been 
characterized in recent decades. 
11 There has been considerable popular attention to the issue of the quality of code in epidemiological simulations 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The quality of these analyses is mixed, for a flavor of some of the commentary see 
for example Lewis 2020.   
12 See Juan Duran (2018) and Winsberg (2019) for an overview of the epistemic issues related to computer 
simulation. 
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the testimony of other people, the reliability of our senses, and the capacity of our basic cognitive 
faculties, such as our memory to transmit information without altering it in epistemically 
significant ways. This use of the idea of epistemic entitlement, largely drawn from Tyler Burge’s 
(1993; 1998) arguments, has been highly influential among philosophers in debates over the 
epistemology of computer simulation (Barberrouse and Vorms (2014), Beisbart (2017)). Symons 
and Alvarado disagree, arguing instead that the analogical account of epistemic warrants is not 
appropriate in the context of computer simulations.  They have insisted instead on epistemic 
standards of the kind we apply to traditional scientific instruments (Symons and Alvarado 2019; 
Alvarado 2020).  On this view, computer simulations are not experts and should not be treated as 
such.  Instead, they are built by teams of experts or by experts working alone who may not be 
expert software engineers.  Thus, given the interdisciplinary integration necessary in a team, the 
use of the analogy with trusting experts is inappropriate.  The analogy is even less fitting in the 
specific case of epidemiological simulation than it is in science more generally, given that 
epidemiology relies on interdisciplinary teams with distinct sets of disciplinary standards. 
Furthermore, the resulting simulations are heavily mediated by what Eric Winsberg called 
motley practices (Winsberg 2010).   
The fact that we are not able to trust computer simulations by analogy with the manner in 
which we trust individual scientific experts leaves us with the problem of how policy makers and 
the public should decide which simulations and which models to rely upon.  There are many 
dimensions to this challenge and it is beyond the scope of this paper to address this broader 
problem (see, for example, Symons and Alvarado 2019).  Trusting simulations involves many 
complicated criteria.  However, for the remainder of this paper we will argue that at least one 
obvious and necessary condition for justifiable use of simulations for public policy is that they be 
funded, managed, specified, designed, implemented, and maintained in accordance with the best 
available software engineering practices.  We contend in this paper that these practices are as 
important to software-intensive policy-making as good experimental methods are in non-
software-intensive scientific regimes. Our recommendations will increase the cost of these 
simulation efforts and will require increased collaboration between scientists and software 
engineers.  However, we contend that the risks involved in decisions based on epidemiological 
modeling efforts warrant the additional resources and effort that we recommend here. 
 
4.0  Standards for software engineering 
 
As with all aspects of epidemiology, engineering standards governing the development of 
simulations are a matter where normative considerations overlap with technical and 
mathematical constraints.  Because of this, critical scrutiny of these simulations is not the 
exclusive purview of any subset of scientific experts as we argued above.  Practical guidelines 
for developers of scientific software are described and defended below.   We did not invent these 
standards.  Instead, our recommendations draw upon the recent history of engineering.  For the 
past five decades, the software engineering community has sought to codify practices and 
procedures that have been empirically determined to help minimize development cost, schedule, 
and risk (Boehm 1973; Myers 1976; Boehm, Abts, Brown, Chulani, Clark, Horowitz et al. 2000). 
This effort has produced an evolving series of software engineering standards, one of the most 
recent of which is ISO 2017.   
We should begin by acknowledging that scientific software is generally not developed 
according to standards anywhere near as demanding as ISO 2017.  Thus, our recommendations 
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will be controversial and may be regarded as excessively restrictive for those who view 
epidemiology solely in terms of its scientific character.   
The most controversial feature of our proposal is the application of an approach drawn 
from engineering ethics to a discipline that primarily regards itself as a science.13  While the 
responsible practice of engineering is generally sensitive to the harms involved in various 
projects (Roddis1993; Lynch & Kline 2000), our critics may respond that a science like 
epidemiology is different.  The ethics of scientific inquiry, one might argue, are very different 
from the ethics of engineering.   Most philosophers are likely to agree.  The kinds of simulations 
that epidemiologists have produced have been regarded by philosophers, for example, as either 
formal or abstract objects or as special forms of experiments capable of yielding empirical 
information about the systems they simulate.14  Following Alvarado (2020) we believe that in 
addition to serving as formal models or experiments, simulations should also be understood as 
scientific instruments.   
In the pages that follow, we will defend our contention that epidemiological models 
should be evaluated in the same way we evaluate engineered instruments.  As Roddis (1993) 
notes, in engineering ethics, the standards governing instruments and practices are determined, at 
least in part, by the harms that can result from failures.  We contend that high standards are 
required for software engineering in epidemiological simulators given the high costs of failure 
involved in the deployment of these instruments in public policy decision making.   
We argue that where great harms can result, scientists, funding agencies, and 
governments ought to adopt standards of software engineering that are at least as high as the 
standards that societies routinely demand in, for example, critical infrastructure, aviation, or 
military contexts.  Because of the nature and extent of the harm to societies that errors in these 
simulations can cause, epidemiological modelers are subject to a special obligation to adhere to 
high standards in the development of their software.   
The principal objection to insisting on such standards is the risk that convergence to a 
single set of standards might inhibit or slow the development of scientific inquiry.  We believe 
that this risk is overstated and that open and transparent scientific software built to high 
standards is likely to help rather than hinder the scientific enterprise.  Additionally, there is a 
difference between the kind of anarchic creativity that might permit scientific insight and the 
construction of scientific instruments like computer simulations.15 
 
 
 
13 Epidemiologists sometimes present their work as a basic science for clinical practice in medicine.  See eg. Sackett 
et. al (1985) and Bonita et.al (2006) 
14 Weisberg (2012) and Pincock (2011), regard computer models as formal extension of mathematical 
representation. Morrison, (2009; 2015) regards computer simulations as being a form of scientific experimentation 
(Ruphy, 2015). Morrison and others have argued that computer simulations involve extra-mathematical 
considerations (Winsberg, 2018). These include measurement practices (Morrison, 2009), representations and 
imaging (Barberousse et al., 2009), and hypothesis testing and generation (Hartmann, 2005).  Alvarado offers an 
alternative view of computer simulations as instruments (2020).   
15 For a defense of treating computer simulations as instruments see Alvarado 2020 
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5.0  Software engineering standards in pandemic policy-making 
 
Since the late 1960s, the software engineering community has sought to codify consensus 
software development practices and procedures that have been (empirically) determined to help 
minimize development cost, risk (both developmental and operational),  and to help ensure that 
the products of such projects reflect user needs and values (Boehm 1973; Myers 1976; Boehm, 
Abts, Brown, Chulani, Clark, Horowitz et al. 2000). These codification efforts have produced a 
series of software engineering standards.16  As mentioned above, one of the most recent and 
widely used software engineering standards is ISO 2017.  Although there is some variation 
among these standards, they characterize software projects in terms of lifecycle phases, each 
with formal review and documentation requirements, both which directly contribute to the 
transparency, explainability, and reproducibility of the software developed under those 
standards. These phases are: 
 
1. specification 
2. logical design  
3. physical design 
4. implementation 
5. test  
6. maintenance  
 
The economic and risk-management rationale for a phase-structured approach to software 
development and management is based on two major premises (Boehm 1981, 38): 
 
I. In order to create a “successful” software product, we must, in effect, execute all of the 
phases at some stage anyway. 
II. Any different ordering of the phases will produce a less successful software product. 
 
Rationale (I) follows directly from questions that inevitably arise in the development of any 
software system: “What is the software supposed to do?” (Specification phase), “How do we 
ensure that everyone who helps to develop part the software understands how his/her part of the 
software correctly integrates with the rest of the software?”, especially if not all personnel know 
all aspects of the system  (Logical, and Physical, design phases),17 and “How do we determine 
that the software is doing what is supposed to do” (Test phase).   
Rationale (II) derives directly from empirical studies of the costs of fixing an error in a 
software system as a function of the phase in which the error is detected and corrected.  These 
studies show that in a large (> ~50,000 source lines of code (SLOC; Boehm, Abts, Brown, 
 
16 Such a standard is not a contract; in the absence of a contract, compliance with a standard is therefore voluntary.  
A contract, however, can make compliance with a standard mandatory. 
17 On average, five years after initial deployment of a software system, only 20% the original developers of the 
software remain on the project ( Boehm, Abts, Brown, Chulani, Clark, Horowitz et al. 2000, 48).  10 years after 
initial deployment, on average, none of the original developers remain on the project.  On small projects, 
furthermore, the loss of even a single key team member can force the project to restart or be abandoned.  Detailed 
documentation is the only way to mitigate these risks. 
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Chulani, Clark, Horowitz et al. 2000, 395)) or highly technical software project, a typical error is 
100 times more expensive to correct in the maintenance phase than in the specification phase; in 
small projects (< ~10,000 SLOC), a typical error is 20 times more expensive to correct in the 
maintenance phase than in the specification phase (Boehm 1976; Boehm 1981, 40). 
Each of phases 1-6 imposes requirements on, or equivalently, allocates requirements to 
the processes and products of one or more successor phases. Taken end-to-end, the resulting 
requirements-allocation induces a hypergraph (Berge 1973) spanning the elements 
(documentation, processes, and code) in the system.  
Documentation is crucial to ensuring the transparency, explainability, and reproducibility 
of software. It is sometimes incorrectly assumed that the code in a software system determines 
what that software is intended to do.  One reason that the code as such does not fully determine 
the intended application semantics of the code is this: Any program, regardless of what the code 
seems to be about,  could be used solely to show that the machine on which it runs will in some 
sense cycle the program, without regard to anything else that program is supposed to do.  Here 
are two examples of software, each of which appears to have a definite use based on a reading of 
the code proper, has a quite different use.  In the early 1980s, a large US military data-
communications system contained a program, that appeared to be data-communications code 
(and in fact had once been used as such). By 1985, however, this program was used solely to 
stress-test the ageing, ailing disk drives in the system.  Similarly, in the early 1990s a large 
European research institute owned what looked like (and in fact once was) a nuclear reactor 
control code.  But by 1995, that code was used solely to test the performance of executables 
produced by Fortran compilers.  The reason for mentioning these cases is that software 
engineering concerns more than just code.  Only the combination of the specification, the logical 
design documentation, the physical design documentation, various test suites, and the code 
proper, can capture what the code is supposed to do.   
Obviously, there is no guarantee that using a software development process of the kind 
described in this section will produce an error-free software system.18 It is  all but certain, 
however, that if such a framework is not used, the system, with very high probability, will 
contain errors that could have been avoided if such a framework had been adopted (Boehm 1973; 
Boehm 1976; Myers 1976; Boehm 1981, 40).  
The standards allow tailoring or editing, as a function of cost, schedule, risk to property 
and life, and other harms of comparable consequence.   Software whose failure would result in 
inconsequential loss of property, life, or revenue, for example software developed solely for 
personal use, can be developed with little formality according to these standards. In contrast, 
consensus standards in software engineering require that software whose failure could result in 
large loss of property or life (e.g., aircraft or automobile control) ought to be developed with 
extensive formality.19  
While informal software development is often tolerated in academic contexts, standards 
must be higher in the case of epidemiological modeling that is used in public-health policy-
 
18 See Horner and Symons 2019b for a discussion of whether it is even possible, in all cases of interest, to determine 
that we have produced error-free software.   
19 For further information, see Boehm, Abts, Brown, Chulani, Clark, Horowitz et al. 2000, Hatton 1995,  ISO 2017, 
Koopman 2014, MISRA 2008, NASA 2004, Rierson 2013, RTCA 2012, and FDA 2002. 
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making.  Why? The epidemiological simulators used in policy-making are typically used in a 
way that errors in those simulators could lead to substantial loss of property or life, or to other 
harms of comparable consequence.   
The development of general software engineering standards has combined a recognition 
of both general principles of engineering ethics and attention to the empirical features of 
software engineering practice.  In the next section we apply these standards to ICL 2020c. 
 
 
5.1 A case study 
 
As mentioned above, the Imperial College London (ICL) covid-19 simulator is arguably one of 
the most influential pieces of scientific software in the history of public health policy-making.  
Given its role in informing the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic by policy makers in the 
United Kingdom and the United States it should be developed and managed with the formality 
required by the standards like ISO 2017.   
 During the period from late-March through late-May 2020, we assessed how well the 
publicly accessible artifacts (ICL 2020c) of the ICL covid-19 simulator project conform to the 
consensus software engineering standards framework outlined in the previous section.  As 
mentioned above, our assessment was based on informed software engineering judgment, 
reading those artifacts, building and executing some of the code, and applying various analysis 
tools (identified below) to the artifacts in that archive.  
Our assessment was constrained by some important limitations.  Most importantly, to our 
knowledge, there is no publicly accessible documentation that officially identifies the baseline 
for the ICL covid-19 simulator project, though a cursory inspection of publicly available 
materials might suggest otherwise. For example, as of 12 June 2020, an ICL covid-19 project 
website (ICL 2020d) appears to identify the mapping between certain code archives and various 
team papers and reports.  Our analysis revealed, however, that the code archives identified on 
this website contained modification date/time stamps that are later than the issuance dates of 
these papers and reports. We further discovered that some of the graphics that appeared in the 
papers and reports referenced on the website were not directly produced by any of the code in the 
associated code archives.  (It is possible, of course, that some of these graphics were produced by 
applying software that is not identified in the reports/papers or on the website to the outputs of 
code that does appear in the archives.) In addition, according to Eglen (2020), ICL 2020c is not 
identical to the version of the code that produced the tables in ICL 2020b (“Report 9”).  
However, Eglen reports that a CODECHECK assessment of ICL 2020c produces results that 
agree with the content of some tables in ICL 2020b for the test cases run in Eglen 2020.     It is 
therefore not possible to infer from this website, or from the papers/reports linked at this website, 
the identity of the specific code used produce the results reported in associated papers and 
reports.   
We note that there is, at present, no legal or institutional requirement for the ICL 
simulator project to make any software-development artifact of that project accessible to the 
general public.  It is not surprising, therefore, that, even if they exist, many of the artifacts 
identified in the consensus software engineering standards are not publicly available in the ICL 
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simulator project. In our judgement, however, it is highly likely that ICL 2020c is closer to the 
actual ICL covid-19 simulator project baseline than any other publicly available artifact; 
accordingly, we chose ICL 2020c, along with the published articles and reports identified in ICL 
2020d, as the baseline for the analysis reported here.  
Our first recommendation is that in future epidemiological simulator projects, funding 
agencies and scientific journals ought to require the provision of a project baseline for the 
purposes of reproducibility and verification.    
Assuming ICL 2020c as the baseline for our assessment, Sections 5.1.1 – 5.1.6 describe, 
at a high level, the major features of each phase of the software engineering process described in 
ISO 2017 and assess how well, within the limitations described above, ICL 2020c conforms to 
that standard.  Detail on each of these phases can be found in ISO 2017.  For the purposes of this 
paper, it is sufficient to sketch them only in outline. 
 
 
5.1.1  Specification Phase 
 
The principal function of the specification phase of a software project is to generate an 
agreement (called the specification) among stakeholders that states what objectives a software 
system must achieve.  Among other things, the specification is intended to reflect the results of 
the negotiation of stakeholder values.  In the case of epidemiology simulator development 
projects, such tradeoffs can concern negotiations of the tradeoffs between the rights of the 
younger and the elderly, or tradeoffs in  optimizing on the social-distancing directives/guidelines 
collides directly with other activities that all but require person-to-person physical contact. (In 
several stakeholder communities, these tradeoffs (as of mid-2020) have yet to be resolved.)   In 
some policy-making venues, furthermore,  the general public is a stakeholder and thus can 
legitimately claim a right to have, in a timely way, access to all policy-related artifacts such as 
simulator rationale, design, and implementation (a view institutionalized, for example, in UK 
Government Office for Science 2010): 
 
73. SACs [Scientific Advisory Committees] and their secretariats should aim to 
prepare papers in accessible language. Where issues require technical discussion, 
consideration should be given to separate, and additional, production of a ‘lay 
summary’ to ensure that all matters are accessible to all interested parties 
regardless of specialist knowledge. (UK Government Office for Science 2011, 18) 
 
Justifiable decision-making typically requires transparency and explainability – even insuring, in 
some cases, some level of lay understanding.20  Policy makers cannot be expected to be able to 
 
20 European Union law establishes a right to explanation in relation to the use of technology in important decisions 
affecting individual citizens.  See for example   https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1465452422595&uri=CELEX:32016R0679 Rectital 71 (accessed June 8 2020).  French 
national law establishes the right to explanation in the 2016 Loi pour une République numérique.  See also Morely, 
Cowls, Taddeo, and Floridi 2020.  Such a right is not categorical, however.  In the case of code and documentation 
that contains information whose disclosure could compromise national security, access to these artifacts must be 
restricted.  
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evaluate models and simulations at the level of technical detail, but modelers should be 
transparent with respect to, for example, the degrees of uncertainty involved in their predictions.  
In complex decision-making problems facing policy makers, modelers must therefore represent 
the extent to which their predictions should be believed. Trusting experts is unavoidable and 
fully appropriate in certain domains, especially those with high technical content. However, as 
we discussed above, expertise in technical, scientific, or engineering domains (such as 
epidemiology), does not imply expertise with respect to societal goals and values.   
Relevant value considerations and assumptions shaping the development of the 
simulation should be explicitly stated in the Specification to the extent possible.  The degree to 
which precautionary or other values enter into the choice of parameters, data sources, etc. should 
also be captured in the specification, because they can affect our understanding of the meaning of 
the predictions derived from the simulation. 
Unfortunately, there is no publicly accessible specification for ICL 2020c.  Ideally, future 
iterations of this and related simulators ought to be generated according to publicly negotiated 
specifications.  At the very least, the specifications stipulated by the modelers themselves should 
be made available to the public.  
Modelers and their funding organizations might protest that epidemiological simulation is 
a time-sensitive project whose urgency precludes such public deliberation.  We contend, 
however, that the trust invested in epidemiologists by the public and their political 
representatives in these contexts means that they must be able to provide a well-articulated and 
understandable specification.  We recognize that maintaining and managing any publicly 
accessible archive requires non-trivial cost and schedule commitments.  A clear specification will 
explain the purpose and assumptions of the simulator in ways that will help ensure its 
trustworthiness and will permit all stakeholders to properly evaluate its relevance to their 
decisions.   
 
 
5.1.2 Logical Design Phase 
 
The objective of the logical design phase is to generate an abstract description, called a Logical 
Design Document, of a system that satisfies the requirements of the specification. Understanding 
what “satisfaction” means in the software development process is not simple and it involves 
considerations beyond the scope of this paper. For an explanation of the notion of satisfaction in 
the context of software development projects, see Symons and Horner 2019.   
 The abstract description that satisfies the specification assumes no particular 
implementation in hardware, software, or human procedures. Various languages can be used to 
express the logical design.  In current practice, the Unified Modeling Language (see, for 
example, Rumbaugh, Jacobson, and Booch 1999) is often used for this purpose. No software is 
generated during this phase. There is no publicly accessible Logical Design document in ICL 
2020c. This is not unusual for scientific software, but it does violate the consensus standards for 
software deployed in high risk contexts.   
 
 
5.1.3 Physical Design Phase 
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The objective of the physical design phase is to generate a concrete description, typically called 
the Physical Design Document, or Detailed Physical Design Document, of how specific 
machines, software, and human processes, and their interactions, will satisfy the requirements 
allocated to them from prior phases.  The software-specific component of the Physical Design 
Document is often called the Software Design Document, or SDD.  (For a detailed description of 
an SDD, see US Department of Defense 1988.)  Assuming ~50 software statements per page of 
source code, this document typically contains ~10 pages per page of source code. No software is 
generated is generated during this phase.  There is no publicly accessible SDD for ICL 2020c. 
However, a few items that would be contained in an SDD are included in the inline comments of 
the source code in ICL 2020c.   
 
 
5.1.4  Implementation Phase 
 
This phase implements on actual machines, and in software and human procedures, an 
operational product that satisfies the requirements allocated to it from prior phases.  The software 
developed during implementation phase is typically required to satisfy certain programming-
language-specific standards (sometimes called “coding guidelines”). These standards prescribe 
programming-language-specific practices that are, and proscribe practices that are not, 
acceptable.   (Such requirements are often stated in, and inherited by allocation from, the 
specification.) The primary role of these programming-language-specific standards is to 
minimize programming-language-specific coding errors.21   
By “manually” analyzing ICL 2020c along with the reports and papers associated with that 
archive we determined that the source code in ICL 2020c was intended primarily to study the 
effect of “interventions” (e.g., school closings, social distancing) and population-distribution 
details on the course of a pandemic.  Based on our analysis of inline comments in the source 
code, and on the style of the code itself, the code in ICL 2020c appears to have descended from a 
multi-thousand-statement simulator written in the C language by one developer in the early 
2000s.  In its current form, the code is almost entirely implemented in the C language subset of 
C++. For example, ICL 2020c makes no use of C++ classes or type polymorphism.22  
By applying the static source code analyzer Understand (Scientific Tools 2020) to the 
source code in ICL 2020c we found that the code consists of ~1000 declarative/definitional, and 
~10,000 executable, statements, distributed across approximately 30 files.  Half of these 
statements are in a single file that contains the source for the simulator’s main routine.   
The  complexity of software serves as a rough measure of the intelligibility and the 
maintainability of the code (Symons and Horner 2014). All else being equal, software 
engineering attempts to minimize the complexity of a software system while satisfying all other 
requirements on that system.  There are many way to measure software complexity.  One of the 
 
21 For examples of such standards, see Hatton 1995; Evans 2003; Perforce 2013; Google 2020. 
22 We made this assessment by reading the ICL 2020c source code, and by analyzing the ICL 2020c source code 
with the documentation tool doxygen (van Heesch 2020) and the static source code analyzer Understand (Scientific 
Tools 2020). 
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more widely used measures of software complexity is McCabe complexity.  Informally put, 
McCabe complexity is the number of distinct execution paths through the code (McCabe 1974). 
Statistically, the frequency of errors in software is an increasing function of McCabe complexity 
(Basili and Perricone 1984).  ~50% of ICL2020c has extremely high McCable complexity.   
Most of this complexity comes from deeply nested “if, then” statements, the understanding of 
which requires the reader or software developer of the code to maintain awareness of long chains 
of conditionality. 
A simulator typically requires that the user enter input values for the parameters that are 
relevant to the model underlying the simulation.  “Manual” analysis of the ICL 2020c source 
code and its input files reveals that in order to generate a simulation, one must enter 40-50 
distinct values.  To configure ICL 2020c requires that users have reliable data supporting 40-50 
input-variables and parameter-assignments.  For the most part these are data derived from public 
health sources but in some cases it is less clear how these assignments are determined.  The high 
number of parameters in this simulator and its resulting complexity cannot be avoided at some 
level if the model is to assess the effects of even the intervention regimes that have already been 
deployed by various countries.  As a result, ICL 2020c is unavoidably more difficult to 
comprehend, correctly use (arguably, only the authors of the code can reliably use it), calibrate, 
and maintain than lower-fidelity epidemiological models such as SEIR (for a description of 
SEIR, see Vynnycky and White 2010; Nowak and May 2000).  Transparency with respect to 
these parameters is important in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the simulator.    
With the exception of the high-complexity portion of the code mentioned above, the ICL 
simulator is, as of 15 September 202, being modified in a way that is generally in accordance 
with at least some of the software engineering standards we have described here. The scope of 
those modifications has to date been relatively limited.  Based on time-stamps in ICL 2020c, the 
code has experienced, on average, average annual change traffic (number-of-statements-of-
software-changed/total-number-software-statements in the system) of ~5%.  This fraction is 
typical of software that has undergone relatively minor modifications, not of software that has 
been wholly re-engineered (Boehm 1981, 543; Boehm, Abts, Brown, Chulani, Clark, Horowitz 
et al. 2000, 28). This assessment was based on manually analyzing the source code in ICL 2020c 
and our experience with software engineering standards and practices. 
 
 
5.1.5 Test Phase 
 
This phase determines whether the product generated in the Implementation phase (Section 2.5) 
satisfies all requirements allocated to the software.  Testing is typically performed at various 
software-build levels.  There is no publicly accessible Test Plan, Test Report, or official 
Regression Test for ICL 2020c.  (ICL 2020c does contain some test files, but what quality-
control role those files are intended to support is not identified in ICL2020c).  Eglen 2020 reports 
the results of porting, without modification, the source code in ICL 2020c to two small 
supercomputing platforms.  Using test files provided by the ICL covid-19 simulator team (it is 
not clear these are the test files included in ICL 2020c), the ported code produced results that 
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were the “same” as the results of some tables in ICL 2020b (“Report 9”).  It should be noted, as 
Eglen 2020 does, that these demonstrations show nothing about the correctness of ICL 2020c. 
 
5.1.6  Maintenance Phase 
 
This phase iterates the phases described in Sections 2.2 – 2.6 after the product is deployed, as 
needed.  Maintenance policies and procedures are documented in a Maintenance Manual.  
There is no publicly accessible Maintenance Manual for ICL 2020c. 
 
 
6.0  Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have argued that epidemiological simulators are de facto integral to 
epidemiological policy making. Justifiable policy-making in epidemiological crises such as the 
current COVID-19 pandemic involves trades among diverse values. Some of these values, such 
as tradeoffs between the rights of children and the rights of the elderly, lie outside the scope of 
epidemiology proper. Some of the values, including the need to assess the objective effects of 
various interventions, clearly lie within the scope of traditional epistemology. Furthermore, 
normative considerations play a role in determining what counts as an epidemic and what counts 
as an acceptable form of public health intervention.   
 We have explained why the norms from high-risk engineering contexts should be 
adopted in epidemiological contexts that have direct and significant public policy implications.  
In all projects of this kind, we urge teams to adopt methods that support transparency, 
explainability, and reproducibility within the framework of consensus safety-critical software 
engineering standards.  We urge journals and funding agencies to require that published results 
include access to a baseline instance of relevant software along with all the relevant 
documentation for implementation in order to ensure reproducibility and transparency.  
 Our assessment shows that ICL 2020c does not satisfy the standards for safety-critical 
software identified above.  It is clear, however, that the developers/maintainers of ICL 2020c 
have recently been modifying that simulator in a way that accommodates at least some of the 
consensus software engineering standards that we recommend.  This is commendable and we 
encourage the ICL team to continue work in this direction.   
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